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Abstract
We derive a novel version of information-disturbance theorems for mutually
unbiased observables. We show that the information gain by Eve inevitably
makes the outcomes by Bob in the conjugate basis not only erroneous but
random.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1984, Bennett and Brassard [1] proposed a quantum key distribution protocol which is
now called as BB84 protocol. Its unconditional security was first proved by Mayers [2] in 1996
and after his proof the various proofs [3–5] have appeared. Among them, a proof by Biham,
Boyer, Boykin, Mor, and Roychowdhury [4] is based upon a so-called information disturbance
theorem. According to the theorem, the information gain by Eve inevitably induces errors in
outcomes obtained by Bob. This disturbance enables Alice and Bob to notice the existence
of eavesdroppers. As well as its application to BB84 protocol, since it can be regarded
as an information theoretic version of uncertainty relation, the theorem has attracted many
authors [6–8]. Recently, Boykin and Roychowdhury [9] showed a simple proof of the theorem
in an arbitrary dimension by using purification technique and trace norm inequality. We, in
this paper, derive a different version of the theorem. Our information-disturbance theorem
is an inequality between the information gain by Eve and the randomness (rather than error
probability) of the outcomes obtained by Bob. We compare our theorem with the previous
one and discuss its implication.
II. SETTING
Let us begin with a setting. Three characters, Alice, Bob and Eve play their roles. Our
setting is a simplified version of BB84 quantum key distribution protocol. The following
analysis, however, can be applied to the full BB84 protocol with public discussion procedures.
Let us consider two pairs of orthogonal states, b := {|0〉, |1〉} and its conjugate b := {|0〉, |1〉}
in C2. They are assumed mutually unbiased with each other. That is,
〈i|k〉 =
√
1
2
(−1)ik
holds for each pair of i, k ∈ {0, 1}. Alice first selects b or b which is used to encode a random
number. Alice next randomly generates an N -bits sequence i ∈ {0, 1}N with probability
p(i) = 1
2N
. We write A a random variable representing this N -bits sequence. Alice encodes
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this information on N -qubits and sends them to Bob. For instance, suppose that Alice
selects b and generates a sequence i = i1i2 · · · iN , she sends the corresponding state |i〉 =
|i1〉 ⊗ |i2〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |iN〉 ∈ C
2 ⊗ · · · ⊗C2 =: HA ≃ HB to Bob. If the conjugate basis b and a
sequence j = j1j2 · · · jN are chosen, the state sent to Bob is |j〉 = |j1〉⊗|j2〉⊗· · ·⊗|jN 〉 ∈ HA.
Alice, after confirming that Bob actually has received N -qubits, informs him of the basis she
used. Bob makes a measurement with respect to the basis and obtains an outcome. Let us
write B the random variable representing this outcome. If there is no eavesdropper, A = B
naturally follows. Eve wants to obtain the information of the random variable A. For the
purpose, Eve prepares an apparatus and makes it interact with the N -qubits sent to Bob
by Alice. Let us denote HE a Hilbert space describing Eve’s apparatus. In general, Eve’s
operation is described by a unitary operator U ,
U : HE ⊗HA →HE ⊗HB
|0〉 ⊗ |i〉 7→
∑
j
|Eij〉 ⊗ |j〉, (1)
where |0〉 is a normalized vector in HE and {|Eij〉} ⊂ HE satisfies unitarity condition:∑
j∈{0,1}N 〈Eij|Ekj〉 = δik. After this interaction, Eve tries to make an optimal measurement
on her apparatus to extract the information of A.
III. INFORMATION-DISTURBANCE THEOREM
A. Information v.s. Error
One can show that if Eve’s operation yields herself to gain large information, error
probability in qubits sent to Bob in the conjugate basis becomes inevitably large. It has
been called as information-disturbance theorem and was proved in [4,9].
The representation (1) depends upon the choice of the basis. It is useful to rewrite
the same unitary operator in the conjugate basis, b. Using |i〉 =
∑
l∈{0,1}N |l〉〈l|i〉 and
|i〉 =
∑
j∈{0,1}N |j〉〈j|i〉, we obtain U |0〉 ⊗ |l〉 =
∑
s∈{0,1}N |Els〉 ⊗ |s〉, where |Els〉 :=∑
i,j∈{0,1}N |Eij〉〈s|j〉〈i|l〉.
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When Alice chooses basis b and a sequence i ∈ {0, 1}N , a state obtained by Eve is
computed as ρiEve :=
∑
j∈{0,1}N |Eij〉〈Eij|. Later we consider how much information Eve can
extract from it. When Alice chooses another basis b and a sequence i, Bob obtains a state
ρiBob =
∑
j,l∈{0,1}N
〈Eil|Eij〉|j〉〈l| (2)
in the presence of Eve. Later we consider the error it induces to the outcome.
Let us begin with Eve’s information gain. Eve performs a measurement (POVM) X :=
{Xα} on her state. (POVM is a family of positive operators satisfying
∑
αXα = 1.) We put
E[X ] a random variable representing the outcome. Probability to obtain an outcome α is
p(α|i, b) = tr (Xαρ
i
Eve). Information gain by Eve with respect to a POVM X is calculated
as,
I (A : E[X ]|b) = H (A|b) +H (E[X ]|b)−H (A,E[X ]|b)
=
1
2N
∑
α
∑
i
p(α|i)

log p(α|i)− log∑
j
p(α|j)

+N,
where H(·) means Shannon entropy. What we are interested in is its optimal value with
respect to all the possible measurements by Eve:
I (A : E|b) := sup {I (A : E[X ]|b) |X = {Xα}is a POVM in HE} .
Now we consider outcomes obtained by Bob in the conjugate basis. Remind that when
Alice chooses basis b, the state sent to Bob is (2). Bob makes a measurement of an observable
∑
j|j〉〈j|. We put B a random variable for this outcome. The probability to obtain each
outcome is expressed as p(j|i, b) = 〈Eij|Eij〉. Thus probability to obtain an outcome whose
difference from input is c ∈ {0, 1}N , is
p(B = A⊕ c|b) :=
∑
i
1
2N
p(i⊕ c|i, b)
=
1
2N
∑
i
〈Ei i⊕c|Ei i⊕c〉, (3)
where the symbol “⊕” is a bit-wise XOR operation. By use of these quantities, the
information-disturbance theorem obtained by Boykin and Roychowdhury is expressed as
[10]
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I(A : E|b) ≤ 4N
√∑
c 6=0
p(B = A⊕ c|b), (4)
whose right hand side is proportional to the square root of the error probability in Bob’s
outcome. That is, their theorem claims that the information gain by Eve makes Bob’s
outcome in conjugate basis erroneous.
B. Information v.s. Randomness
We next derive a new information-disturbance theorem which relates information gain
by Eve with randomness in Bob’s outcome.
To estimate the information gain by Eve, we introduce a symmetrized attack as in [4].
We add N auxiliary qubits to Eve’s apparatus and thus the Eve’s Hilbert space is dilated
to HE′ := C
2 ⊗ · · · ⊗C2 ⊗HE . Introduce a set of new vectors {|E
s
ij〉} in this Hilbert space
HE′ as
|Esij〉 :=
√
1
2N
∑
m∈{0,1}N
(−1)m·(i⊕j)|m〉 ⊗ |Ei⊕m j⊕m〉,
where “⊕” is again a bit-wise XOR operation and “·” represents bit-wise multiplications
followed by their summation. Introduce a symmetrized attack as
Us : HE′ ⊗HA →HE′ ⊗HB
(|0〉 ⊗ |0〉)⊗ |i〉 7→
∑
j
|Esij〉 ⊗ |j〉
which can be extended to satisfy unitarity condition [4]. Although this symmetrized attack
is different from the original attack, it is shown below that to treat this new attack is useful.
If we employ the symmetrized attack, Eve has a state described as ρiEve,sym :=∑
j∈{0,1}N |E
s
ij〉〈E
s
ij|. To extract the information from it, she can measure the value of the
auxiliary N -qubits and then apply a POVM X = {Xα} on the original apparatus HE . It
is shown that this strategy gives same amount of information with the original attack. The
values obtained by the first measurement are equally distributed, that is, each value m is
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obtained with probability 1
2N
. After obtaining a value m, the reduction of wave packet forces
the state into
ρim :=
∑
j
|Ei⊕m j⊕m〉〈Ei⊕m j⊕m|.
The second measurement gives a probability
ps(α|i,m) =
∑
j
〈Ei⊕m j⊕m|Xα|Ei⊕m j⊕m〉,
from which it is easy to see that ps(α|i,m) = p(α|i⊕m) holds. Thus by using conditional
probability ps(α,m|i) = 1
2N
p(α|i ⊕ m), mutual information can be computed to coincide
with I(A : E[X ]|b). Taking a supremum over all the possible POVM over the full Hilbert
space HE′ can make it larger and therefore the following inequality holds [4],
I(A : E|b) ≤ I(A : E|b)sym, (5)
where the right hand side is the optimal information gain by the symmetrized attack.
Now we can state our theorem.
Theorem 1 The following inequality holds:
I(A : E|b) ≤ H(A⊕B|b), (6)
where H(·) is the Shannon entropy. That is, the information gain by Eve in the basis b
makes the outcome of measurement by Bob in the conjugate basis b random.
Proof: We can prove the theorem by first symmetrizing the attack and next bounding
Eve’s information gain by Holevo’s inequality. Thanks to (5), it is sufficient to estimate the
quantity I(A,E|b)sym for our purpose. Holevo’s theorem [11] bounds it from above as
I(A : E|b)sym ≤ S
(
1
2N
∑
i
ρiEve,sym
)
−
∑
i
1
2N
S
(
ρiEve,sym
)
=: χ
(
{ρiEve,sym}
)
,
where S(ρ) is von Neumann entropy of a state ρ. There exists a useful representation of
this quantity χ. Consider another additional N -qubits Hilbert space HR and a state over
HR ⊗HE′,
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Θ :=
∑
i
1
2N
|i〉〈i| ⊗ ρiEve,sym.
Its quantum mutual entropy between HR and HE is shown to coincide with the quantity
χ
(
{ρiEve,sym}
)
,
I(Θ) := S (Θ|E′) + S (Θ|R)− S (Θ) = χ
(
{ρiEve,sym}
)
,
where Θ|E′ is a restricted state to HE′ of Θ and Θ|R is defined in the same manner. To
estimate this quantity, we consider a purification of ρiEve,sym. Introduce another N -qubits
system HP and states over HE′ ⊗ HP [4], |ϕi〉 :=
∑
j |E
s
ij〉 ⊗ |i ⊕ j〉. A state Θ˜ over HR ⊗
HE′ ⊗HP defined as
Θ˜ :=
∑
i
1
2N
|i〉〈i| ⊗ |ϕi〉〈ϕi|
gives Θ if restricted to HR⊗HE′. By using subadditivity for the entropy difference [12], the
mutual entropy I(Θ˜) between HR and HE′ ⊗HP is shown to be larger than I(Θ). Therefore
we estimate the quantity,
I(Θ˜) := S
(
Θ˜
∣∣∣
E′P
)
+ S
(
Θ˜
∣∣∣
R
)
− S
(
Θ˜
)
.
Now we compute the restricted states over the subsystems,
Θ˜
∣∣∣
R
=
∑
ij
1
2N
〈Esij |E
s
ij〉|i〉〈i| =
1
2N
1,
Θ˜
∣∣∣
E′P
=
∑
i
1
2N
|ϕi〉〈ϕi|.
The von Neumann entropy of Θ˜
∣∣∣
R
is N .
To compute the von Neumann entropy of Θ˜ itself, we purify this by adding an additional
N -qubits HT and define a state over HT ⊗HR ⊗HE′ ⊗HP ,
|Ψ〉 :=
∑
i
√
1
2N
|i〉 ⊗ |i〉 ⊗ |ϕi〉.
Taking partial trace over HR ⊗HE′ ⊗HP leads
∑
i
1
2N
〈ϕi|ϕi〉|i〉〈i|. =
1
2N
1
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whose entropy also is N . Thus the mutual entropy is completely determined by Θ˜
∣∣∣
E′P
as
I(Θ˜) = S
(∑
i
1
2N
|ϕi〉〈ϕi|
)
.
Now let us calculate the von Neumann entropy of Θ˜
∣∣∣
E′P
. Again a purification using an
additional N -qubits HZ to HE′ ⊗HP gives a state
|Φ〉 :=
∑
i
√
1
2N
|i〉 ⊗ |ϕi〉
on HZ ⊗HE′ ⊗HP . Its restriction to HZ gives
σ :=
1
2N
∑
ij
∑
n
〈Esj j⊕u|E
s
i i⊕u〉|i〉〈j|
whose entropy agrees with I(Θ˜). Let us consider its components with respect to the basis
{|i〉}. Since
∑
u
〈Esj j⊕u|E
s
i i⊕u〉 =
1
2N
∑
n
∑
u
〈Ej⊕u j⊕n⊕u|Ei⊕u i⊕n⊕u〉
holds, it depends upon only i⊕ j. We write it as f(i⊕ j) to represent σ as
σ =
1
2N
∑
ij
f(i⊕ j)|i〉〈j|,
which can be diagonalized by an orthonormalized vectors
|µi〉 :=
√
1
2N
∑
l
(−1)i·l|l〉
as σ =
∑
l λl|µl〉〈µl|, with λl :=
1
2N
∑
t f(t)(−1)
t·l. The eigenvalue λl is calculated as
λl :=
1
2N
∑
t
f(t)(−1)t·l
=
1
2N
∑
t,n,v
〈Ev v⊕n|Et⊕v t⊕v⊕n〉(−1)
t·l
=
(
1
2N
)2 ∑
t,n,v
∑
ij
∑
i′j′
〈Eij|Ei′j′〉〈j|v ⊕ n〉〈v|i〉〈t⊕ v ⊕ n|j′〉〈i′|t⊕ v〉(−1)
t·l.
Since we are treating mutually unbiased case,
〈i|k〉 =
√
1
2N
(−1)i·k
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holds, where i · k :=
∑N
n=1 inkn. It leads
λl =
(
1
2N
)4∑
δi⊕j⊕i′⊕j′,0δj⊕j′,0δj′⊕i′⊕l,0〈Eij |Ei′j′〉
=
1
2N
∑
i
〈Ei i⊕l|Ei i⊕l〉
which is nothing but p(B = A ⊕ l|b) introduced in (3). Finally we obtain the following
inequality,
I(A : E|b) ≤ H(A⊕ B|b).
Q.E.D.
IV. DISCUSSIONS
Below we discuss the implication of our theorem by comparing it with the former one.
Since the right hand side of our inequality is determined by {p(B = A ⊕ c|b)}, it can be
reduced to a form which includes only the term
∑
c 6=0 p(B = A⊕ c|b).
Corollary 2 [13] The following inequality between the information gain by Eve and the
error probability in Bob’s outcome holds:
I(A : E|b) ≤ −δ log δ − (1− δ) log(1− δ) +Nδ,
where δ :=
∑
c 6=0 p(B = A⊕ c|b).
Proof:
Under the constraint δ =
∑
c 6=0 p(B = A⊕ c|b) for fixed δ, the distribution which makes the
Shannon entropy H(A⊕ B|b) maximum is p(B = A|b) = 1− δ and p(B = A⊕ c|b) = δ
2N−1
for all c 6= 0. It gives
H(A⊕ B|b) = −δ log δ − (1− δ) log δ + δ log(2N − 1)
and ends the proof. Q.E.D.
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For a fixed error probability δ =
∑
c 6=0 p(B = A⊕ c|b), for sufficiently large N , the term
Nδ becomes dominant in the right hand side of the above equation. Thus our inequality
becomes tighter than (4) in such a case.
Finally we present a situation which shows a drastic difference between the two inequal-
ities. Suppose that Eve employs the following “attack”: Eve does not make the qubits sent
by Alice interact with any apparatus, but she just converts the each value. That is, for
each qubit, Eve performs a unitary operation |i〉 7→ (−1)i|i〉 (i = 0, 1). One can easily see
that also for the conjugate basis this operation works as conversion. In this case the error
probability δ becomes 1. Thus if we employ the inequality (4), it is impossible to rule out the
possibility of Eve’s information gain. On the other hand, since the error in Bob’s outcome
is deterministic, the right hand side of (6) vanishes. Thus our theorem can convince us that
there is no information gain by Eve.
In this paper we showed a novel version of information-disturbance theorems. According
to our theorem, one can see that the information gain by Eve induces randomness to Bob’s
outcome in the conjugate basis. The both sides of the inequality are expressed in terms of
entropy and thus seems to be natural. For large N case, in which we are usually interested
in, our inequality gives tighter bound than the previously proposed ones. Moreover, our
theorem can rule out the case when Eve just turns over the qubits and gains no information.
Our theorem, as previous one, also relies upon the assumptions of fair probability of the
random variable A and mutually unbiasedness between b and b. It will be very interesting
and crucial to generalize the theorem to more general setting [14].
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